Workers' health in the inter-war years has been the subject ofrecent enquiry and was a topic that generated much contentious contemporary debate.' The focus of discussion has been the impact ofmass unemployment and consequent deprivation on standards of health, physique, and general well-being. The object here is to open up a further, so far very neglected dimension, by switching attention to the workplace, and investigating the theme of health at work in the 1920s and 1930s.2 The present generation has grown up with the knowledge that work, working conditions, and technology may seriously affect the mental and physical health and well-being of individual workers, and that health, fitness, and fatigue can considerably influence productivity levels and efflciency. Evidence of these correlations accumulated with the practical work of the Factory Inspectorate from the 1830s, the weight of experience of a relatively thin strand of welfarist, humanitarian employers (of the G. Cadbury and S. Rowntree genre), and the experimentation of "scientific management" theorizers, including the Americans, F. W. Taylor (time study) and F. and L. Gilbreth (motion study). Research into the scientific basis ofindustrial fatigue, efficiency, and health was only in its infancy, with the result that individual worker productivity was relatively poor, certainly in many cases far from achieving its full potential.7 This was the consequence partly of excessive energy expenditure at work, exacerbated by relatively poor general standards of health, as indicated in the Report of the Interdepartmental Committee on Physical Deterioration of 1904, which had been established to investigate the causes of the very high rejection rates ofwould-be army recruits on health and physique grounds during the Boer War.
the relationship of the hours of labour and of other conditions of employment; including methods of work, to the production of fatigue, having regard both to industrial efficiency and to the preservation of health amongst the workers. "4 This essay examines the impact of work organization and the work environment on employees' health, focusing in particular on the origins and work ofthe IHRB from its formation (as the Industrial Fatigue Research Board) through the 1920s and 1930s.5 It is based largely on the surviving archives and reports ofthe Board, held by the Medical Research Council in London. Section I examines the genesis of the Board and the circumstances surrounding its formation and composition. Section II investigates the work of the Board, its orientation and role in the 1920s and 1930s. Finally, Section III analyses the dissemination of research findings and new ideas on industrial health and efficiency and relates this to general trends in work organisation, technological change, and health at work in the inter-war years.
I
The IHRB emerged from the experience gained in industrial health, efficiency, and the management of labour during World War I, with the mass influx of women workers into war industries. Before 1914, physiological and psychological health at work was severely neglected by the vast majority of British managers and employers, most ofwhom were concerned only to stay within the legal limits of the Factory Acts.6
Research into the scientific basis ofindustrial fatigue, efficiency, and health was only in its infancy, with the result that individual worker productivity was relatively poor, certainly in many cases far from achieving its full potential.7 This was the consequence partly of excessive energy expenditure at work, exacerbated by relatively poor general standards of health, as indicated in the Report of the Interdepartmental Committee on Physical Deterioration of 1904, which had been established to investigate the causes of the very high rejection rates ofwould-be army recruits on health and physique grounds during the Boer War.
It was the First World War, 1914-18, however, that really brought the debate on industrial health and efficiency into the public arena. Within a year of the first shots being fired, the British war effort was facing serious problems on the "home front" because the productivity of munitions workers was declining as a consequence of accumulated and in many cases chronic fatigue. Workers "We shall certainly have to go 'canny' for some time at the beginning".' 0 The Board's initial sensitivity towards antagonizing the trade unions was clearly indicated when it refused to support the ongoing research ofH. M. Vernon into deliberate worker output restriction in the shipyards."1 Fletcher was also keen from the outset to ensure that no connexion was made between the emerging British "fatigue studies" school and the American scientific management movement, which tended, he asserted, towards exploiting workers with the object of maximizing profit margins, and to take a very mechanical, instrumental view of the workman as "only a human machine".12 In a letter to J. R. Clynes, Labour leader in Parliament, Fletcher elaborated on his own conception of what the orientation of the British "fatigue studies" group should be: "The study, rightly conceived, and its results rightly applied must bring, I am convinced, its chief benefits to the workers themselves. We must make every effort to start from the beginning in fullest sympathy with the workers, and we can do little or nothing without their help, both in the study and in its applications." 3 Throughout 1918 and the early part of 1919, an interim committee of the Board was canvassing for suitably qualified members. A number of interested organizations suggested names. George Cadbury's Anti-Sweating League nominated Charles Renold-an indication of the esteem in which the enlightened firm of Renold & Company was held. 14 Renold, however, was not the final choice, for Fletcher preferred to invite a representative of Mather & Platt, the Manchester engineering firm which had pioneered the study ofindustrial fatigue in the 1890s. ' Whilst the Board determined policy and direction, a cadre of professional investigators undertook the detailed empirical research into health, efficiency, and industrial fatigue. Here the links with the HMWC were close, as a number of the Committee's field workers and researchers, including H. M. Vernon, Professor T. Loveday, and A. F. Stanley Kent, transferred their services to the IHRB, usually on a part-time basis, as many held permanent academic posts. By 1920, the investigating staff of the Board numbered twenty-five, supported by eleven clerks and several secretaries.22
II
The role of the IHRB was to study scientifically the human factor in industry and particularly the health and efficiency problems created by modern industrial conditions and technological change.23 It was not in the business of maximizing productivity for its own sake, at any cost, as some ofits detractors argued,24 but rather to discover, through scientific analysis, precise work measurement, and calculations of energy expenditure at work, the optimum conditions and methods of work for the operatives. This, both the Board and the Factory Inspectorate argued, provided common benefits for employers and workmen.25 It also involved a search for the easiest, most energy-conserving methods ofwork, rather than necessarily the quickest, and brought the Board into conflict with the American-inspired maximizing efficiency engineering school of thought. Indeed, as a component part of the "human factor industrial psychology" school, the board was responsible for the exposure of what Rose has called "the scientific crudity of Taylorism".26
The IHRB was inspired by the wastage that arose from the indifference shown in Britain towards physiological and psychological aspects ofindustry, and the ignorance of the principles governing the healthy employment of the human mind and body. It was pointed out that over ten times as much production time was lost through sickness-much ofwhich was preventable-as was lost through strikes and disputes.27
Research in this area thus had enormous potential. The philosophy of the Board from its earliest days was that "maximum production is contingent on maximum fitness on the part of the worker".28 However, in essence, it was a fact-finding research body formed to acquire and accumulate scientific knowledge and was not directly involved in policy decision-making, as it made clear in its first Annual Report: "The object of the Board is to obtain exact facts about fatigue caused by industrial employment in different trades and under different conditions in the same trade, but the Board is not itself concerned with the alteration of existing conditions by legislation or otherwise. The results obtained will be published, and then it will be possible for persons employed and others interested to make any suggestions they think necessary for improved conditions when they have weighed the facts."29 Noting, however, the crucial need for practical verification of the Board's findings, employers were encouraged to commit themselves to extended scientific investigation within their companies to improve labour health and efficiency.30 The stimulation of the habit of experimentation was thus considered to be one of the main objects of the IHRB.
The work ofthe Board involved a mix offield-work at the workplace and laboratory research. It responded to requests from individual industries to investigate labour efficiency and health, and elaborated general principles and hypotheses relating to the causation, measurement, and incidence of industrial fatigue. It concentrated almost solely on the workplace. Unlike the HMWC, the Board did not investigate external factors-economic, dietary, social, or educational-which were known to influence health and industrial efficiency. However, several investigations were taken over from the HMWC, and a number ofnew initiatives undertaken on request from employers or suggestions from the government. Representatives of Joint Industrial Councils, employers' associations, industrial research associations, and trade unions, together with one of the specialist Factory Inspectors, would usually form a sub-committee to advise on technical points and criticize or comment on the research progress of the Board's investigators working in their particular industry.3' Indeed, the Board encouraged the permanent establishment of such joint committees in all industries to discuss questions of industrial health and efficiency and medical research transmitted by the IHRB. This anticipated network of special industry-wide committees proved, however, to be an ideal that never fully materialized in the 1920s and 1930s.
The emphasis of the IHRB's work altered in response to circumstances, as the early years were fraught with disruptions. The Board was formed at a time when excessively long hours were still being worked during wartime (though the position was much improved in comparison to Nevertheless, up to 1939 the Board produced eighty-four special research monographs and numerous articles in the academic and medical press. These significantly extended the theoretical knowledge in Britain of the "human factor" in industry (which had been largely confined to the munitions/engineering industry) and indicated, using scientific analysis in a number of different industries and occupations-including textiles, metals and engineering, mining, boot and shoe, printing, pottery, laundries, and the leather trade-that productivity was closely related to the health of the workers. The IHRB started with investigations into the hours of labour and the working environment, moved into analyses of methods of work, job design, and vocational psychology, and, by the later 1930s, concentration was increasingly laid on specific medical topics (including occupational disease).
The false economy of working over a certain number of hours, depending on the mental and physical strain involved in performing the task, was clearly shown by H. M. Vernon in his pioneering work for the HMWC. Vernon and other IHRB investigators continued this project by elaborating, for a range of tasks and occupations, the optimum working hours. Vernon's methods were to chart hourly output curves by some form of recording production (for example, the use of automatic pick recorders on looms), identify the incidence of worker fatigue, and eliminate this as far as possible by experimenting with shorter hours, rest pauses, and improved working methods and conditions, the result of close analysis of the labour process, the technology employed, and the ways in which energy was expended on the job.34 Organized and systematic rest pauses were one way to arrest the onset of industrial fatigue. On machine and conveyor operations, for example, it was found that a pause of five minutes each hour was a far more efficient method than a 10-15 minute tea break in the middle of the work spell.35
The IHRB also publicized the idea that workers' bodies were highly sensitive to changes in temperature, humidity, noise, and light and that these could have an extremely variable effect on efficiency. In a number of investigations into fine and very detailed work, the Board calculated the appropriate levels ofillumination according to the size of the detail to be distinguished. Researchers found that in silk-weaving, for example, productivity was reduced by up to ten per cent where artificial rather than natural light was used.36 One solution suggested by the Board was the use of slightly magnifying spectacles for such categories of work.37
Similarly, the Board developed, through scientific investigation and measurement, a comprehensive range of data on the best temperatures, humidity levels, and air speeds to produce the highest productivity levels for different occupations and processes. This work was pioneered by S. Wyatt, A. B. Hill, H. M. Vernon, and T. Bedford, using various instruments such as the kata-thermometer, developed by Sir Leonard Hill to measure the combined effects of temperature and air velocity. Research concentrated on the hot, heavy industries, including the iron, steel and tinplate trades, coal-mining, and cotton-weaving.38 Some of the results indicated enormous wastage. In mining, there was found to be up to a forty-one per cent loss of efficiency in hot and poorly ventilated shafts, whilst in one iron and steel works, twelve per cent less was produced on average in summer than in winter because there was no artificial ventilation.39 In cotton-weaving, an investigation of the records of 10,000 weavers in "steamed" sheds compared to 10,000 in "dry" sheds indicated that whilst excessive steaming may have reduced individual efficiency, there was no correlation between sickness incidence and workers' exposure to "normal" levels of steam.40 The statistical basis of the inquiry was such that both the unions and the employers accepted this as the definitive answer to a question that had caused much controversy in the industry.41 On the other hand, the Board did find that in other occupations, atmospheric conditions had a considerable influence on both sickness-and accident-proneness. Steel-smelters, puddlers, and pitmen in the iron and steel trades lost twenty-two per cent more time than the average in their industry due to sickness. Accident-proneness, it was also found, increased considerably in colder temperatures, due to a loss of manual dexterity.42
Vibration, dust, and noise were also the subject of investigation in an attempt to indicate the relationship between such variables and labour productivity. All had adverse effects in varying quantities, and as a result the Board championed their elimination in the workplace, or protection against them in the form of localized dust-extractor systems and ear-protectors. In cotton-weaving, using the traditional Lancashire looms, eight per cent more production on average was forthcoming when ear-protectors were used, which eliminated around fifty per cent of the noise.43 One important finding was the considerable variation in each individual's reaction to noise, depending, the Board hypothesized, on the particular psychological make-up of the individual. A. B. Hill also followed up his statistical inquiry into artificial humidity in cotton-weaving with a similar investigation into the relationship between inhaling cotton dust in the cardroom (where preparatory processes prior to spinning took place) and respiratory disease. His results indicated clearly the extremely dangerous 38 The research interests of the Board in the 1920s tended to shift from hours of work and environmental conditions to methods of work, job design, and vocational psychology, aspects more closely related to the scientific management movement ofthe American "efficiency engineers", like F. Taylor and F. Gilbreth. The Board pioneered vocational guidance and performance testing in Britain-both physiological and psychological-developing techniques to ensure that workers were placed in the occupations for which they were best fitted. Being a "misfit", with no inherent capacity to perform the work task, lowered a worker's "fatigue threshold" and was detrimental to health, so vocational selection and training were seen to offset overstrain.45 There was, moreover, much evidence of workers being physically unsuitable not only for recruitment into the armed forces, but also for particular work tasks. Professor E. P. Cathcart undertook a statistical inquiry for the IHRB into the weight, height, and strength of over 10,000 men in 1933-4, the most comprehensive investigation into physique since the infamous wartime Ministry of National Service C3 The commitment of the Board to improving methods of work and job designs was indicated by their early utilization of time and motion studies. The explicit aim of such studies was to identify and measure obstacles to easy performance ofthe work task and thus to reduce needless energy expenditure and consequently relieve the physical and mental strain of work. C. S. Myers of studies in textile plants, and M. Smith an investigation of laundries.5' The Board laid great emphasis on the advantages to be derived from closely studying the labour process, formulating a set of the most efficient movements for each task, rationalizing the arrangement of tools and materials, studying the design of machinery, and carefully training workers in the improved methods ofdoing the job.52 Optimum loads and the best working height of the bench were also calculated. The Board advocated close union co-operation during any work measurement exercise and an equitable wage incentive scheme; that is, one that did not incorporate an automatic pricebreaker, as the premium bonus system did.53 The latter was particularly dangerous for weaker workers, who spurred themselves on, often into serious overstrain.54 As Vernon argued, one of the most frequent causes of excessive fatigue in the 1920s was the speeding-up tendencies of unsuitable systems of remuneration.55
The potential for increased productivity with reduced energy expenditure and improved health using such methods was clearly realized, and the IHRB postulated that if such scientific management methods were introduced in a fair and just manner, with the object of improving work methods and reducing energy expenditure, rather than simply "speeding-up" work, then the benefits for both management and men were enormous.56 The problem lay in the application of such concepts. The IHRB investigators claimed never to have used the stop-watch to set "standard" times for tasks, nor, as the efficiency engineers used them, with a view to necessarily increasing output.57 Nevertheless, workers were particularly suspicious of this aspect of the Board's work, regarding it as an unwarranted monitoring procedure, an interference and a humiliation, and a first step to speeding up production.58 In fact, the Board spoke out on a number of occasions against the intensifying pace of work which characterized much of inter-war industry.
The Board developed, in conjunction with a number of other organizations-most prominent of which was the National Institute of Industrial Psychology-a vitriolic critique of the methods of what they regarded as the "pseudo-scientific" Americaninfluenced managerial school, and advocated a peculiarly British brand of labour management, more "humanized" and based firmly on the empirical findings of the more purely scientific "fatigue studies" and industrial psychology investigations. This was the basis ofits labour management philosophy. Workers should preferably be allowed to control their own speed ofwork and make adjustments to their pace as and when the chose: "The work of the human machine cannot be ticked out in seconds as by a clock. It has rhythm, and the rhythm varies-work has its ups and downs-in tune to the pulse of physical and mental energy, which itself rises and ebbs in accordance with the physiological laws governing the functions of all living organisms."61 E.
Farmer argued that the question of rhythm was all-important. Fatigue resulted when effort norms were excessively increased because of the interference generated with the natural rhythm of the body. 62 As far as the labour process is concerned, it would be a fair generalization to state that the trend in industry in the inter-war period with the shift in emphasis from the older, declining staple industries, to the newer, more prosperous industries was towards more mechanized, uniform, sub-divided, light, repetitive work which placed a premium on dexterity and mental capacity, rather than muscle. The Chief Medical Inspector of Factories noted in 1935: "Speed is the essence of present day industry, as exemplified in the conveyor system ... wherein a single operation is performed, minute in and minute out, throughout the working day. It is too early yet to judge ofthe results ofthis system on the health ofthe workers so employed, but some apprehension cannot but be felt as to its ultimate effects."63 The IHRB consequently devoted its energies to investigating the psychology of work, and particularly the problem of monotony, producing a whole series of reports incorporating the results of their surveys into light, repetitive work.64 In general, they found that efficiency was seriously impaired by lack ofjob satisfaction, resulting commonly in a loss of 10-30 per cent of potential output and a decrease in the quality of work.65 As an antidote to monotonyefined as the flagging of mental energy, expressing itself in a feeling of apathy and lassitude-the Board suggested specific changes in work design to increase interest, rotation of the most simple tasks at intervals rather than specialization, psychological and physiological selection tests to find the most suitable personnel, shorter working hours, more frequent rest pauses and breaks, and, finally, music piped into the workplace.66 Piece-rate working was considered an essential incentive for repetitive work, though Wyatt, Frost, and Stock found in 1934 that such payment systems could have adverse side-effects (including increased jealousy, strained relations, and irritability), especially affecting the slower and less capable operatives.67 In other words, incentives prolonged effort but at a cost: "At the same time it is often responsible for undesirable forms of behaviour and may be the cause of much unhappiness. It stimulates the selfish and assertive tendencies in human nature and while the more capable workers find this pleasant and satisfying, those who are less well endowed may become discouraged and depressed."68
The emphasis in the Board's work shifted in the 1930s to an analysis of a range of psychological problems related to work and, through their links with the MRC, the Board made a number of inquiries into specific medical problems of health at work. There were a number of mechanisms by which the work of the IHRB percolated through to industry. Its findings were marketed in the form of highly technical, academic research monographs through HMSO, and its researchers also used the medical and growing labour management press to present their arguments and hypotheses. However, a number ofindependent organizations were largely responsible for the practical diffusion of the "fatigue studies" ideology. Here engineering" approach to labour management and of employer-initiated welfare schemes, such as that operating at ICI.78 He advocated the application of psychological investigation and knowledge to the problems of industry and industrial relations, this to be done with the fullest consultation of the workers themselves.79
Though they had their differences, relations between the IHRB and the NIIP were close throughout the 1920s and 1930s, and the Institute played a significant, if not crucial, role in disseminating the ideas of the Board.80 Myers was both a member of the Board and the director of the NIIP in the 1920s and '30s. Arrangements were made by the Board in 1921 for complete co-operation and free interchange of investigators with the Institute.81 This arrangement worked well to provide Board investigators with fieldwork experience in individual factories, and Institute researchers with laboratory facilities, and thus to provide the closest intimacy between pure and applied research. The Board advertised the services of the NIIP in its reports and monographs, whilst the Quarterly Journal of the NIIP provided a forum for a precis of the Board's research findings and ongoing work, often with some discussion of the possible practical applications.82 Moreover, the debt of the Institute to the pure research undertaken by the Board was recognized by Myers and was indicated clearly in a number of the NIIP's publications. In a collection of articles by NIIP researchers edited by Myers in 1929, for example, forty per cent of the references cited in the bibliography were IHRB or HMWC publications.83 The Institute continued to develop through the 1920s and 1930s and was responsible for the practical dissemination of the Fatigue Board's findings as well as encouraging the idea of scientific-based experimentation into industrial efficiency and health.84 As the Board recognized: "It conducts for individual firms practical investigations into the way in which human energy is being used, such as time and motion studies, routing and lay-out investigations, surveys of hours of work and of environmental factors such as heating, lighting and ventilation etc., and by doing so is enabled to recommend in practice the adoption of measures based not only on the results of its own investigations, but on the more general results of the research work of the Board."85 Some representation was also sought by the IHRB at a number of conferences and seminars, though it certainly did not seek a high profile. Hence, Sir David Munro's introductory address to the 38th Oxford Management Conference on Optimum Productivity in Modem Industry in 1938 was commented on as a rare appearance (and a great privilege!) by the IHRB secretary. Munro proceeded with a vituperative attack on the efficiency engineers' labour management techniques. The more enlightened participants of the Oxford Management Conferences organized by Rowntree had almost certainly read many of the Board's monographs and registered a continuing interest in its work.86 Moreover, the reports of such conferences indicate that the questions of fatigue, industrial health, and energy expenditure at work were often on the agenda.
The work of the Board also found a place in the discussions of the Management Research Groups (MRGs) in the late 1920s and the 1930s, and Harry Ward, the secretary of Group No. 1, received copies of the Board's research monographs.87 The MRGs were established in 1927 and were the inspiration of B. S. Rowntree, with C. G. Renold and L. Urwick being prominent in the movement in its early days. 88 The idea was to establish a number of groups "to promote the efficiency ofmanagement in commerce and industry through the encouragement of the study of management problems, the exchange of experience between firms and organisations, and the provision ofinformation". 89 Amongst a broad range oftopics, MRG 1 discussed the Bedaux system, fatigue, and rest pauses in the early 1930s. Whilst C. Walton, of Lever, expressed extreme suspicion of organized rest pauses, the consensus was that well-organized spells of work, punctuated with periodic rest and refreshment periods, preferably combined with some change of posture and movement, gave the best physiological effects, reduced industrial fatigue, and resulted in enhanced output at no adverse cost to the workers' health.90 This indicates that some of the crucial tenets of IHRB ideology were beginning to penetrate the minds ofa number ofenlightened industry leaders. Whether such practices were widespread on the shop floor in such firms is another matter. Regrettably, MRG 1 did not undertake a systematic survey of work spells and rest pauses amongst its member firms.
The British Science Guild (BSG) also played a part in disseminating the research work of the IHRB in the 1920s and 1930s. It developed into a pressure group promoting public awareness about the connexions between science and industry, agitating for improved educational facilities and increased financial support-state and private-for scientific research and generally to improve the status of science and the utilization of scientific methods in the running of the country.93 This included the promotion of scientific methods of labour management and particularly the implementation of the research work of the Board and the NIIP.94 The Guild thus championed vocational selection and training, motion study, fatigue studies, rest pauses, experimentation with work spells, and improved machinery design. It also encouraged a drastic shake-up in British management to achieve the input ofmen of scientific background and training. The practical impact of the Guild's work, however, is difficult to assess, and in 1936 it was finally absorbed into the British Association for the Advancement of Science.95
A number of organizations and groups concerned specifically with industrial health and welfare also played a part in digesting and disseminating the results of the IHRB's research. Welfare and medical officers employed in firms provided an important link between research and practical application, as did the Factory Inspectorate. On a smaller scale, the Industrial Welfare Society (IWS) performed a similar role to the NIIP, in so far as they gave coverage to IHRB findings in theirjournal and based many of their "practical plans for welfare work" which went beyond statutory requirements on the work and findings of the Board in this field. In sum, the results of the IHRB's work were percolating through to industry from a number of sources, and some significant successes indicate at least a degree of penetration of the industrial psychology and fatigue studies ideology to the workplace in the 1930s. Clearly, many of the largest firms, especially those in the expanding, newer sector of the economy, which often enjoyed a protected market position, were aware ofits work and had adopted some changes in labour management in line with its research.'0' The formation of the NIIP and the continuation and development of its work in the 1920s and 1930s reflects industry's increased interest in industrial psychology and fatigue studies. Moreover, from the mid-1930s, a number of government departments were officially recognizing the science of vocational psychology as an aid to the recruitment and selection ofadolescents for particular jobs and occupations, and the Army Council adopted psychological selection tests for recruits. 102 The idea of music being piped into the workplace to relieve monotony was accepted by a number ofemployers, and the demand was such that the BBC produced the 'Music While You Work' programmes in the late 1930s. The consolidation of the 1918-19 reduction in working hours (to around 47-8 per week for the majority of British workers) over the 1920s and 1930s, and the Holidays with Pay legislation of 1938-9, also undoubtedly owed something to the Board's propaganda that excessive working hours were uneconomical as well as unhealthy. The 1937 Factory Act, moreover, incorporated the results of IHRB work into the value of short rest pauses, guidelines on weight-carrying, and the use of special spectacles for fine, close work. 103 It also legalized the 48-hour working week as a maximum, reduced permissible overtime to six hours per week, made the provision ofwashing, cloakroom, and seating facilities compulsory in all factories, and included provisions empowering the Secretary of State to enforce regular medical inspection of workers where he had reason to believe that illness might be due to the nature of the work. The utilization of electricity as a power source in these new factories and its spread to some older plants, facilitated by the completion of the National Grid in 1933, considerably enhanced and improved healthy working conditions. One result was the implementation of much more efficient lighting systems-particularly noticeable in factories located in rural districts-utilizing sodium discharge and mercury vapour discharge lamps. 110 The noise levels of older, mechanical transmission driving was also much reduced with electricity, and this facilitated the introduction of the wireless into factories in the later 1930s.' 1 l Moreover, the use of electricity as a prime mover meant not only much more flexibility and efficiency in power transmission, but also the elimination of the chaos of drive belts, shafts, pulleys, and gears, which characterized the nineteenth-century steam-powered workshop and mill, and which were the cause of innumerable accidents, many fatal.112 Electric drive also enabled emergency stop-motion devices to be installed much more cheaply and easily at every machine, or at least in every room.113 The importance of the latter in accident prevention was recognized when it was made compulsory from July 1938 under the 1937 Factories Act.
Whilst the newer, relatively prosperous industries provided, in general, a much healthier working environment, there were a number of negative aspects, arguably detrimental to the health and well-being of employees. Greater distances from home to work often added considerably to the working day. New technology and new materials replaced old health hazards with new ones. Skin cancers and dermatitis, for example, increased with the expansion in petrochemicals and plastics industries, whilst death and injury through electric shock partially, at least, compensated for the reduced accident rate registered on transmission machinery.'14 This was partly a problem of ignorance of elementary technical principles of electricity, most of the worst accidents being to unskilled men. Glare produced by improper positioning and inadequate screening of new electric lighting systems was found to be a frequent source of worker fatigue and eye-strain by the Factory Inspectorate, who were also aware that new machinery created novel, unknown risks, especially through the potential for accidents in regard to unfenced moving parts.115
Moreover, it was in the newer, expanding sector of industry where the most far-reaching changes were taking place in the organization ofwork and re-design ofthe labour process. The tendency, as already noted, was towards work of a lighter and less skilled character, with tasks minutely sub-divided on the basis of crude flow production-epitomized by the Henry Ford-inspired conveyor-belt organization of motor-car manufacture. Such work produced, as the IHRB and the Factory Inspectorate testified, new problems of monotony at work linked with intangible and unquantifiable indications of mental stress, anxiety, and nervous tension. The comments of J. C. Bridge, Senior Medical Inspector of Factories, in 1931 are worth citing in some length:
It is true that the pleasure of the craftsman is being crushed by the steady increase in mechanised processes, the result of which is seen in the tendency to rise of sickness rates for 'nervous disabilities' .... Repetition processes undoubtedly create a weariness not expressed in physical terms but in a desire by the worker for temporary relief from the enforced boredom of occupation in which the mind is left partially or entirely unoccupied. This fact must be recognised for the understanding of sickness records and absenteeism in the industrial population. Vastly more days are lost from vague, ill-defined, but no doubt very real, disability due to ennui than from all the recognised industrial diseases together. How this state of affairs is to be controlled is a pressing problem of industrial health at this time. More interest in processes that are themselves dull must be created. Selection of workers is in this problem only of limited value; there are more dull tasks than people suitable for them. Industrial management may solve the difficulty-piece for time rates, a system of promotion on efficiency, bonuses of holidays for unbroken time-keeping, rest pauses with a change of posture and attention, are but a few suggestions in a problem which is a growing one. The uninterested worker is an industrial invalid. Interest in work leads to industrial good health. 1 16 Women in particular suffered from mental exhaustion at work, and causal factors might be highlighted. The first is external to the workplace and reminds us that it is impossible to analyse health at work in a vacuum, for factors outside the workplacehousing, nutrition, family life-crucially affected health, and even the Senior Medical Inspector of Factories accepted that on balance "it is outside the factory where most of the ill-health arises".1 17 The root cause of fatigue amongst working women lay in their dual role as worker/housewife and child-rearer. The second factor is the very character of women's work, their participation in the labour market being restricted largely to the least skilled, least responsible, and most degraded of occupations."18 Whilst accepting that many employers provided good working conditions for women and arguing, somewhat obtusely, that women were somehow intrinsically more adaptable to boring, repetitive work, Sibyl Horner, a Medical Inspector of Factories, went on to comment:
There is, however, an adverse side to industrial life for women, and this is evident to any observer who has the opportunity of studying women at work. They age quickly, their apparent age is the elder sister to their baptismal certificates. Physical attraction is early attained and quickly lost. But so it is with every group of women workers-these facts are not confined to women factory workers. The reason is, I think, this: women's work often begins when it nominally ends. The house and dependents make their claims on the woman worker. Her work is never done. She has, with the possible exception of the unmarried girl, fewer recreations or relaxations than her contemporary male.119
It was in the older, depressed, staple sectors of the economy-including textiles, coal, iron and steel, and shipbuilding-that industrial health standards stagnated in the inter-war years and absorption of innovatory "scientific" ideas on the physiological and psychological conditions conducive to industrial efficiency and worker health was extremely limited. Significantly, most of the IHRB initiatives were directed at identifying and exposing health and fatigue problems in these industries and prescribing preventive measures. Moreover, the Factory Inspectorate singled out the staple industries as providing the least healthy working environment, the result partly of older factory architecture, design, space allocation, technology, habits, and attitudes.'20 L. Bryder and G. Burke have also recently suggested that in two declining sectors, slate-quarrying in N. Wales and metal-mining in Cornwall, standards of health at work deteriorated between 1900 and 1939.121 Workers' health in the "basic industries" was further undermined by two related factors; first, the mental strain and tension of recurrent short-time working, unemployment, and redundancy; second, by the intensified workload, "speeded-up" work pace, and increased direct discipline that generally characterized the shop floor in these years. This is impossible to quantify or assess precisely. Nevertheless, in this sense those in work as well as those unemployed in the so-called "Depressed Areas" suffered a deterioration in standards of health and welfare.
Improving health and welfare was an expensive proposition open only to those firms showing regular profits and to industry leaders enjoying a relatively protected and buoyant market position. Quite the opposite economic scenario confronted employers in the depressed staple sectors, most of whom lacked the financial resources to make voluntary improvements in working conditions. Such firms were wary, moreover, of increasing costs which might not be matched by their competitors, thus conferring a crucial disadvantage in a cut-throat market place. Consequently, the employment of factory welfare officers, nurses, dentists, and doctors was often considered an extravagance, and capital was frequently not available for electrification, lighting renewals, and technological improvement. Two examples help to illustrate this.
First, the Bumley Weavers' Association complained in 1935 that artificial lighting in the town's cotton-weaving sheds was so poor that it resulted in serious eyestrain and fatigue. The Factory Inspectorate confirmed this finding by an examination of illumination in eight sheds.122 Two years later, it was reported that there had been little improvement and that wool and cotton employers took almost no interest in efficient industrial lighting, despite its importance as a source of significant productivity losses. As the Chief Factory Inspector noted; "The subject is, however, difficult, and needs expert technical consideration of spacing, intensity and dispersion and few of the cotton manufacturing firms can at present afford the expert survey and the cost of a reorganised and re-arranged lighting system."123 Consequently, poor lighting arrangements added to the discomfort of working in weaving-sheds artificially steamed to raise humidity and to prevent frequent breakages of heavily sized, inferior yarns and the risk ofcontracting byssinosis ("weaver's cough") from "shuttle kissing" (sucking the yarn through the shuttle).'24 Second, the cotton spinning-mule was responsible for a skin cancer (epitheliomatous ulceration) which was described by 1933 as "now the most menacing of all the industrial diseases that are notifiable".'25 This usually affected the scrotum, and was caused by the use of carcinogenic mineral oil as a lubricant on the spindles, which splashed on to the clothing of the mule-spinners and piecers. From 1923 to 1936, 918 cases were reported, 305 of which resulted in deaths, often ghastly and excruciatingly painful.'26 The obvious preventive measure, periodical medical examination, was rejected by employers on the grounds of cost and custom, and little capital was available to make the switch to the alternative, less risky spinning technology, the ring frame. Long overdue, a simple anti-splash device (whereby the spindle was lubricated by contact with an oil-soaked pad) was first utilized by a large spinning firm in 1938.127 Significantly, however, neither the addition of this device, nor provision for regular medical supervision was incorporated in the 1937 Factories Act.
The IHRB were themselves bitterly disappointed, to the point ofexasperation, at the very poor response of British management, the negligible diffusion of their findings, and the relatively insignificant practical application of their research into industrial health and efficiency on the shop floor in the 1930s. As the Board noted in 1934: "Neglect of physiological principles at work is not far to seek. It is plain to the eye, in every variety of occupation, that man is often put at a physical disadvantage in the use of the tools and machines of his trade."'128 R. T. Medd, a prominent NIIP researcher, added weight to the Board's views when he noted in 1938 that the industrial world was making no active efforts to implement the Board's research work.129 Furthermore, the initial experience of the war, 1939-40, added fuel to this pessimistic indictment of British industry.
The Second World War provided a crucial test ofwhether the work of the industrial psychologists and the fatigue studies experts which emerged out of the 1914-18 war had been absorbed by British industry. The Board was clearly aware ofthe dangers and published in the early part of 1940 the first of its 'Emergency Reports', summarizing previous research findings in simple, non-technical fashion.'30 The response was negative and a large section of industry stumbled into the same kind of mistakes that were made in 1914-15. After the disaster of Dunkirk in June 1940, the upsurge in patriotic fervour and the perception ofthe possibility ofinvasion resulted in excessively lengthening working hours as industry responded to the call for an acceleration in munitions manufacture and the replacement of equipment left on the French beaches.'3' Ironically, this was encouraged by Ernest Bevin, Minister of Labour, an ex-member of the IHRB in the 1930s. This was a repeat of the scenario of 1915 and the "shell scandal"-with similar repercussions. Work was considerably speeded-up, working hours rose (commonly to 70-75 hours per week), holidays were cancelled, and Sunday working implemented. The initial rise in output could not be sustained, however, as the ill-effects of accumulating fatigue manifested itself in increased sickness rates, absenteeism, and a declining capacity to perform normal work tasks adequately. The analogy ofa forced sprint during the early part ofa marathon race was again referred to by the Board, the Factory Inspectorate, and the MRC, who lamented that the work of the Board since 1918 on the physiological and psychological conditions most conducive to optimum efficiency had been largely ignored: "It is regrettable that but little was known about this work either by many industry leaders or by the mass of workmen in the early stages of the war. Had this information been more widely appreciated it might have been possible to avoid the introduction of those excessively strenuous working conditions in the period immediately following the evacuation from Dunkirk which proved incompatible with a large sustained output from the factories and with a good standard of health among the workpeople."'132 Therefore, whilst rationalizing labour management techniques were gaining ground in the inter-war years, especially amongst the newer firms in the expanding sector, evidence nonetheless suggests that a large proportion of British industry continued to lack any positive attitude towards experimentation, work measurement, and scientific analysis of the workplace. Why was this? How can the relative failure of the IHRB pre-1939 to push forward the parameters of industrial health and efficiency be explained? It will be argued that the interaction of three major factors are primarily responsible; marketing constraints, financial cost, and management receptivity.
In marked contrast to the Bedaux consultants, the IHRB failed to market its product well. The Board admitted in 1932 that the most difficult part of its work was the publicizing of its research results and ensuring their application in industry.133 The main vehicle for the dissemination of the Board's research was its Annual Reports and lengthy research monographs. These were solid, detailed pieces of scientific, empirical research, couched in technical language and medical jargon, designed specifically to withstand academic criticism at the very highest level. The Board justified this approach by claiming that its primary role was to press forward with fundamental research on the frontiers of scientific knowledge, present its findings, and not get involved in any wider propaganda work on its own behalf.134 The result, however, was that the work of the Board could rarely be easily digested by its main potential audience: employers, directors, works managers, trade union representatives, and workers themselves. Very few IHRB reports thus sold well enough to go into a second edition (i.e., over 1,000). The Board became increasingly aware of this gap in communication towards the end of the 1930s and appointed a Sub-Committee on Publicity to investigate. HMSO marketing was criticized as restrictive and its advertising as minimal, and reforms were implemented. 135 A short synopsis ofresearch was subsequently written in "popular language", distribution channels opened up with employers' associations, trade unions, and industrial research associations, and articles popularizing the Board's work forwarded to the press-including, on occasions, the Daily Mirror and the Daily Herald. It was not until 1943, however, that the Board initiated a new series of short pamphlets of a non-technical nature summarizing research results for the specific use ofindustry. Part of the problem in the inter-war years, therefore, was a communication gap. Large sections of industry were simply ignorant of the work of the IHRB.
Moreover, as we have already noted, market pressures reduced profit margins to such an extent that there was often little capital available to finance innovatory health and welfare schemes, especially amongst the most depression-hit industries and the smaller firms. The experience of the IHRB was that the depression made employers much more insular and narrowed their horizons as far as labour management was The initiative for changes in working methods and conditions lay clearly with management, and indeed, company executives laid great stress on retaining what they regarded as their prerogative to manage, without interference, as they thought fit. Witness, for example, the 1922 engineering lock-out on this issue. Mass unemployment precipitated a collapse in worker bargaining power and many employers responded not by rationalizing labour management and creating the physiological and psychological conditions conducive to optimum efficiency, but, altematively with a fierce labour cost-cutting offensive in the traditional mode of labour management, incorporating wage reductions, de-manning, intensifying discipline and supervision, using cheaper forms of labour, speeding-up work, and using various methods of victimization to weed out militants and protesters.143 This was the predominant scenario in coal, cotton textiles, shipbuilding, iron and steel, and heavy engineering. Here, the spectre of high unemployment often induced significant improvements in productivity and, over the short-term, negated the need to rationalize scientifically methods of work. So, the response of a large section of industry to the more competitive market environment ofthe 1920s and 1930s was introversion, caution, and the utilization of a series of customary time-honoured tactics to slash labour costs. 144 Scant regard was given to the provision ofconditions conducive to workers' health and hence to industrial efficiency, and little attention was paid to those idealists who argued that this strategy was a poor long-term investment. 145 As the response to the Bedaux system indicates, British employers were more concerned to develop systems to control labour, rather than to improve scientifically worker efficiency, via experimentation into work methods and energy expenditure.
This poor response of British industry to work measurement and scientific analysis of the labour process-and especially the work ofthe IHRB and the NIIP-was partly due to what might be termed the lack of a scientific and experimental habit ofmind. 146 This was in turn largely the product of the relatively poor status of science and management science in particular in the British education system, especially in comparison to the position in the USA and Germany. ' Moreover, management-particularly in the small and medium-sized firms-often retained many of the superstitions and fallacies of the past, including a belief in the linear relationship between hours of work and output (as was shown in the summer of 1940) and a refusal to accept Taylor's maxim (later absorbed within Fordism) that high labour costs could result in lower production costs per unit, if labour management techniques were rationalized. British employers in the staple industries appear to have been obsessed with the idea that slashing wages was the universal solution to all their problems, and this, together with the industrial relations conflicts and antagonisms it generated, obscured them from any rational attempt to address the fundamental problems of worker inefficiency and poor health. Industry, it was argued, was not a playground. Many employers were committed to the fallacy that workers should be seen to be grafting and sweating for their wages, and the idea floated by the HMWC and extended by the IHRB that work should be performed easily, with the minimum of physical and mental strain, was anathema to them. 156 This goes back to the Taylorian concept that basically workers were innately lazy and had to be driven by financial incentives. Here lies the main objection of British management to the implementation of organized rest pauses to break up work spells, for this was, as C. Walton of Lever Brothers argued, simply encouraging indolence, for workers would continue to poach illicit breaks from production even when definite pauses were introduced.157
Moreover, this was the thin end of the wedge, which might lead to pauses being introduced in all departments with a commensurate increase in production costs. The argument that increases in productivity would result from reduced fatigue and healthier working conditions was still treated broadly with scepticism. Bearing this in mind and making allowances for the cluster of larger, newer, more progressive companies in the expanding sectors ofthe economy, L. Urwick's comment in 1937 that industry in Britain was still overwhelmingly dominated by "the nepotism, the politics and the traditionalism of the past"158 seems a pertinent one. General standards of industrial health as a result made only marginal progress.
CONCLUSIONS
This essay has made an assessment of the origins, the work, the orientation, and the achievement of the Industrial Health Research Board, and through this medium, an attempt has been made to shed some insight into the general question of health and efficiency at work during the inter-war years. It has been shown how the Board emerged out of the war emergency, 1914-18, as a progression from the more limited work of the HMWC. It pioneered the scientific study of work in Britain and its main achievement was in vastly extending theoretical knowledge of the physiological and psychological principles governing the healthy and most efficient employment of workers in industry. Its research reports are an exhaustive data source on the way work was organized in Britain and the impact of occupation on workers' health. The Board identified and exposed problems of industrial health and advocated a whole range of preventive measures, including reduced working hours, rest pauses, redesign of the labour process, vocational selection and training, and the reorganization of the general work environment conducive to the highest standards of industrial health.
Its orientation and its motivations are revealing. Its ideology squarely bridged that of the American-inspired efficiency engineering movement and the endogenous welfarist school, epitomized by Cadbury and Rowntree. It advocated a more scientific approach to labour management via detailed investigation and experimentation in the workplace, using time and motion studies, amongst other techniques. This earned it, at least initially, the distrust of organized labour. Yet the Board distanced itself from American management techniques and stressed a much more personal approach, arguing repeatedly that workers were complex psychological and physiological organisms exhibiting great diversity in energy levels and capacity to work. The primary object of the Board's work studies was to improve standards of workers' health. Its motivations, however, were not entirely altruistic, paternalist, or humanitarian in the traditional welfarist sense. It continually emphasized that industrial medicine paid dividends in terms of enhanced worker productivity and thus industrial efficiency; crudely, that there was a direct correlation between standards of workers' fitness and health and profit margins in British industry.
The diffusion of the IHRB's findings and the penetration of its ideology was limited prior to World War II. It has been argued that the large employers in the expanding, modern sector of the economy were most receptive to innovatory labour management ideas emanating from the Board, and that it was in this sector that industrial health was qualitatively improving in the inter-war period. Moreover, the government took the initiative in the 1937 Factories Act to incorporate a number of the Board's findings and modestly to raise basic standards of health, safety, and welfare at work. This was a significant watershed. However, prior to 1937-8, there is evidence of a growing dichotomy in health standards at work between the new industries and the older, depressed staple sector of the economy, where working conditions deteriorated and where absorption of scientific management ideas on the physiological and psychological conditions conducive to industrial efficiency and workers' health were negligible. ' ideology and remained committed to traditional labour management methods. This was the result partly of poor marketing methods by the Board and partly of financial constraints in a period of recession militating against change. Primarily, however, the lack of progress has its roots in the poor receptivity of British industry to scientific concepts and particularly the narrow parochialism and traditional fallacies of many, though not all, employers and managers. This is a salutary reminder that generalizations based on the best practice of the thin strand of "progressive" large firms in Britain can produce distortions of reality. In fact, in the older, staple sectors of the economy the penetration of "scientific management" was negligible, industrial health at best stagnated, and for a large number of workers qualitatively deteriorated prior to 1937-8. In the larger firms, in the newer relatively prosperous sectors, there were advances, yet the potential for improving workers' health, welfare, and efficiency, as indicated by the pioneering research work of the HMWC and the IHRB, was rarely realized in inter-war workshop practice.
